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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
JANESHEPARD, : Case No. 970317-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals her convictions for two counts of possession of a controlled 
substance (psilocybin and marijuana), a third degree felony and a class B misdemeanor, 
respectively, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1997) and for possession 
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(1997). The Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that defendant - a passenger in a 
lawfully stopped vehicle - was not unlawfully detained where dispatch reported that 
the license plate number on the vehicle was listed as "not on file" and where neither 
1 
the driver nor defendant could produce a recognizable vehicle registration form or 
any other document identifying the registered owner of the vehicle or proof of their 
entitlement to use the vehicle? 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the investigating officer had 
probable cause to seize and inspect a corn cob pipe that was in plain view near 
defendant where the officer suspected the pipe was illegal drug paraphernalia? 
A trial court's findings in support of its determination to deny a motion to suppress 
evidence are reviewed under the "deferential clearly-erroneous standard." State v. 
Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). A 
trial court's supporting legal conclusions are "reviewed for correctness, with a measure of 
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." Id 
(citing State v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance (psilocybin), a 
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1997), possession 
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of a controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1997), and possession of drug paraphernalia (a pipe with 
marijuana residue), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(1997) (R. 1-2). 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless vehicle 
search (R. 20-25). Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied (R. 97-99).* 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges in the information, 
reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress (R. 99-108). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to five years to life in the Utah State Prison 
and a fine of $500 with an 85% assessment for the possession of psilocybin, fines and an 
assessment totaling $370.00 for the possession of marijuana, and fines and an assessment 
totaling $185.00 for the possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 106-07). The court stayed 
execution of the prison sentence on condition that defendant pay the fines forthwith and 
placed defendant on probation for 12 months (R. 107). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On July 30,1996, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Sanford Randall was traveling 
southbound on SR 191 in San Juan County when he saw a vehicle coming from the other 
1
 The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law announced from 
the bench are transcribed and reproduced in addendum A. 
2
 The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's ruling. See. 
e.g.. State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182.1186 (Utah 1995). 
3 
direction that appeared to be speeding. Randall estimated that the vehicle was going 
about 74 miles per hour when he first saw it. When the vehicle came into radar range, 
Randall activated his radar unit and determined the vehicle was traveling at 71 miles per 
hour. After the vehicle went past Randall, Randall turn around and stopped the car for 
speeding (R. 31-2, 58-9). 
Defendant was seated in the front passenger seat, and her brother was driving the 
car. Randall asked the driver for his driver's license and the vehicle registration.3 The 
driver handed his driver's license to Randall, but he was unable to produce a vehicle 
registration form. Randall asked the driver if he had any other paperwork, such as an 
insurance certificate, that might include the name of the registered owner (32, 59). 
Although the driver and the defendant indicated their father had recently purchased the 
car, they could not find any documents indicating ownership of the car (R. 65-6). 
Given the lack of registration or other paperwork, Randall decided he should check 
whether the vehicle may have been stolen and had the driver accompany him to his patrol 
car where he asked dispatch to run an NCIC check on the license plate number. Dispatch 
reported that the plate number was "not on file" (R. 33,60,78). Although the "not on 
file" status of the plate may have been consistent with the claim that their father had 
3
 At some point during his initial contact with the driver and defendant, Randall 
explained to the driver that he was going to move to the passenger side of the car so that 
he would be safely out of the way of passing traffic (R. 71-2). The record, however, does 
not clearly show at exactly what point Randall moved to the passenger side of the vehicle. 
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recently purchased the car insofar as the new plate number may not have been recorded, 
Randall still questioned whether the vehicle may have been stolen because he had 
encountered stolen cars in the past that did not have the proper license plates on them and 
because neither the driver nor defendant could produce any paperwork on the vehicle (R. 
72-3,78). 
Randall and the driver returned to the stopped car (R. 33,60). Randall again went 
to the passenger side of the vehicle so that he would be out of the way of passing traffic 
and asked defendant whether she had been able to find any papers reflecting ownership of 
the car. Defendant produced a receipt from a service station showing that work had been 
done on the car, but it had someone else's name on it (R. 33,60,63,67). Randall 
explained to defendant that the receipt made him even more suspicious because of the 
difference in names (R. 33,60, 82). Defendant also produced a document that was 
purportedly a temporary registration form. Randall viewed the form with suspicion 
because it did not appear to have been issued by a government agency (R. 63-4, 78-9). 
The form was completed in handwriting instead of being typed or computer generated 
like other registration forms Randall had seen. Although the form had a VIN number 
written on it, the form included no description of the vehicle or even the name of the 
registered owner (R. 64,67,78-82).4 
4
 Although it appears the temporary registration form was valid, the trial court 
examined the form during the course of the suppression hearing and assessed its 
(continued...) 
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In an attempt to confirm or dispel his suspicion that the car may have been stolen, 
Randall decided to examine the vehicle identification numbers and have dispatch run the 
numbers through NCIC (R. 34, 60,64,79-80). For safety reasons, Randall did not want 
defendant or the driver inside the car while his attention was distracted when examining 
the VIN numbers (R. 64). The driver was already outside the car, and Randall asked the 
defendant to get out of the car while he examined the VIN numbers (R. 62,64). Randall 
was already on the passenger side of the car to be out of the lane of traffic and he 
positioned himself at the front of the passenger door as a matter of courtesy to defendant 
and to ensure he was appropriately positioned for safety reasons as defendant exited the 
car (R. 62, 69-71, 78). 
As defendant was getting out of the car, Randall noticed a corncob pipe in the side 
pocket of the passenger door (R. 34,60,68,79-81). Recognizing the pipe as a type used 
to smoke marijuana as well as tobacco, Randall asked defendant and the driver if they had 
any tobacco (R. 34). Defendant and the driver indicated they did not (R. 34). Randall 
removed the pipe from the door pocket and sniffed it. The pipe smelled of burnt 
marijuana (R. 34, 60, 63). Randall told defendant and the driver their rights under 
4(...continued) 
significance as follows: "this thing here, which is hand prepared, and is obviously not 
printed by some state agen[cy] - well, of course, it could be prepared, but it's not printed 
out by some state agency, and it doesn't have any name on it. It just has a VIN number. 
Again, there's an [articulable] suspicion, justifiable in his mind, at that time, I think, and 
would be reasonable [for Randall to check that VIN number to see if it corresponded with 
the car] to make sure this car wasn't stolen, or illegally possessed" (R. 98). 
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Miranda and asked them if they had marijuana in the car. The driver invoked his right to 
remain silent, but defendant indicated there was'marijuana in the trunk and that she had 
some mushrooms in a cooler behind the front seats (R. 39,60). 
Randall searched the car and found the illegal drugs described by defendant in the 
places defendant indicated they were located. Specifically, he found some marijuana in a 
canning jar in the trunk and mushrooms in the cooler in the back seat (R. 37-61). He also 
found a clay pot containing mushrooms on the floor of the front seat where defendant had 
been seated (R. 60-1). Defendant and the driver were arrested and charged with various 
drug related offenses. Subsequent tests confirmed the mushrooms were psilocybin, that 
the pipe had marijuana residue in it and that the material in the trunk was marijuana (R. 
34-9,62-3). 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the 
warrantless search (R. 20-25 ). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied 
the motion (R. 97-99), see addendum A. The propriety of the initial stop was not in 
dispute, but defendant did claim that Randall improperly exceeded the scope of a routine 
traffic stop and that the seizure of the corncob pipe was not supported by probable cause. 
The trial court rejected both arguments and held that Randall properly investigated the 
possibility that the car was stolen and that the corncob pipe was of a type often used to 
smoke marijuana and that its seizure was therefore proper. The subsequent search of the 
vehicle was likewise supported by probable cause based not only on the corncob pipe, but 
7 
also defendant's admission that there were drugs in the vehicle (R. 97-99). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trooper Randall properly sought to verify that defendant and her brother were 
entitled to be in possession of their lawfully stopped vehicle. Randall's requests for 
insurance papers or other documentation of ownership as well as the running of a 
computer check on the vehicle's license plate number were proper given that neither 
defendant nor her brother produced a recognizable registration form. Randall's was also 
entitled to order defendant to exit the vehicle pending completion of the admittedly lawful 
stop. Upon observing a marijuana pipe inside the car while defendant was exiting the 
vehicle, and considering the totality of the circumstances, Randall's seizure of the pipe 
and the ensuing search of the car were supported by probable cause. This Court should 
therefore uphold the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence and affirm her 
convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TROOPER RANDALL'S REQUESTS FOR VEHICLE 
REGISTRATION INFORMATION AND HIS 
ATTEMPTS TO VERIFY ENTITLEMENT TO USE 
THE VEHICLE WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF A 
ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP 
Trooper Randall was justified in stopping the vehicle in which defendant was a 
passenger based on the fact that he observed the vehicle speeding. Utah courts have 
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consistently recognized that speeding justifies a traffic stop. See, e.g.. State v. Spurgeon, 
904 P.2d 220,225 (Utah App. 1995; (upholding stop for driving seventy-two miles per 
hour in a sixty-five mile per hour speed zone). Defendant's concession that the stop was 
justified at its outset is therefore well-measured (Br. of Appellant at 7). However, 
defendant's challenge to the scope of the ensuing detention is misplaced. Defendant 
misapprehends the legal principles applicable to scope of detention questions and fails to 
fully recognize the totality of the circumstances known to Randall. 
A. Randall's Actions, Up to the Seizure of Defendant's Pipe, Were Within the 
Scopeof Detention of a Routine Traffic Stop. 
Given that the initial stop of the vehicle was justified based on the observed traffic 
violation, the first scope of detention question to consider is what actions Randall was 
authorized to take during that routine traffic stop. The law on this issue is well-
established: 
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license 
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. 
However, once the driver has produced a valid driver's license and evidence 
of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, 
without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning. 
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
In this case, Randall promptly requested and obtained a driver's license from the 
driver. However, the driver and defendant were initially unable to provide a vehicle 
9 
registration form. Randall's requests for other paperwork were within the scope of a 
routine traffic stop insofar as the requested documentation would have helped establish 
"evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle." By the same token, Randall acted within the 
scope of a routine traffic stop when he asked dispatch to run a computer check on the 
license plate number. When the results came back indicating the license plate number 
was "not on file," Randall was justified in again asking defendant whether she had found 
any documents indicating ownership of the vehicle. Up to that point, neither the driver, 
defendant, nor dispatch had been able to provide evidence of who owned the vehicle let 
alone proof that defendant and the driver were entitled to use the vehicle. 
B. Even If Randall's Attempts to Confirm Whether Defendant andHer Brother 
Were Entitled to Use the Car Exceeded the Scope of A Routine Traffic Stop, Randall's 
Investigative Efforts Were Supported By a Reasonable Suspicion That the Car May 
Have Been Stolen. 
Even assuming Randall exceeded the scope of a routine traffic stop by asking for 
documents that may have provided information about the ownership of the car, or by 
preparing to examine the vehicle identification numbers, the expansion of the detention 
was proper. Investigative questioning that further expands the detention permitted under 
a routine traffic stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. 
Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132. As the trial court held, the totality of the circumstances known 
to Randall gave rise to a reasonable suspicion to believe the vehicle may have been stolen 
10 
(R. 97-8). Specifically, Randall had two young people who, though they claimed to be 
driving a car recently purchased by their father, could not produce a vehicle registration 
form or any other document featuring their father's name. When dispatch reported that 
the license plate number was "not on file," Randall diligently pursued a means of 
investigation that was likely to quickly confirm or dispel his suspicion that the vehicle 
may have been stolen. See United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675,686-87,105 S. Ct. 
1568,1575-76 (1985) (holding that where an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, the officer must diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to quickly 
confirm or dispel the suspicions quickly); Citv of St. George v. Carter. 325 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 15,17-18 (Utah App. 1997) (same). 
By asking defendant whether she had found any documents during the time that 
Randall and defendant's brother were in Randall's patrol car awaiting word from 
dispatch, Randall provided defendant and her brother yet a second opportunity to produce 
documentation that would have eliminated the need to have dispatch run a check on the 
VIN number. As Randall testified and the trial court recognized, the fact that defendant 
first produced a receipt for work completed on the car that was in another person's name 
actually served to bolster Randall's suspicion of possible wrongdoing (R. 60,63,97). 
Even the document that later proved to be a valid temporary registration form was very 
unusual. Rather than being typed like most government issued registration forms, the one 
defendant produced was completed in long hand. More to the point, it identified the 
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vehicle only by a vehicle identification and contained no description of the vehicle or 
even the name of the registered owner. By comparing the VIN number written on the 
form produced by defendant to that on the vehicle, Randall would have been able to better 
evaluate the veracity of the unusual registration form. Had it been necessary to have 
dispatch run an NCIC check on the VIN number, Randall would have been able to 
determine whether the vehicle had been reported stolen. Of course, Randall never in fact 
took those actions because, as demonstrated below, probable cause to believe defendant 
was in possession of drug paraphernalia arose before Randall had an opportunity to check 
the VIN number on the car. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that 
Randall's actions up to when he directed defendant to exit the vehicle were supported by 
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle may have been stolen (R. 97-8). As demonstrated 
in subpart C below, the trial court was also correct in holding that Randall was justified in 
directing defendant to exit the car. 
C. Randall Lawfully Directed Defendant to Exit the Vehicle. 
Randall's decision to have defendant exit the vehicle was permissible because she 
was a passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle. The United States Supreme Court has 
ruled as a matter of law that "an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get 
out of the car pending completion of the stop." Maryland v. Wilson. 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 
(1997) (footnote omitted). Under Wilson, the trial court's determination that Randall 
was justified in directing defendant to exit the car was proper, and defendant does not 
12 
contend otherwise. Nor does defendant challenge the trial court's additional conclusion 
that Randall had a reasonable basis for wanting defendant outside the vehicle as a safety 
precaution while he examined the VIN numbers, presumably because that ruling is amply 
supported by the record. Instead, defendant suggests that Randall's "reasons for going to 
the passenger side of the car are suspect" and that Randall's testimony that he stood by 
the door while defendant exited the car as a matter of "politeness" and to enhance his own 
safety should "be viewed with skepticism" (Br. of Appellant at 9-10). In so doing, 
defendant essentially asks this Court to ignore the trial court's implied determination that 
Randall's testimony about why he was on the passenger side of the car was credible. This 
Court should not indulge defendant because credibility assessments are best reserved for 
the trial judge who is able to observe the demeanor of witnesses firsthand. See, e.g., 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 (because trial court judges are "in the best position to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an 
appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold recordf,]" findings of fact will be 
reversed only upon a showing of clear error). Accordingly, to the extent defendant 
seems to argue in Point II of her brief that Randall conducted a "search" of the vehicle 
merely because he stood by the passenger side door while defendant opened the door and 
got out of the car, this Court should refuse to consider that issue. 
13 
D. Defendant's Claim that Randall Lacked Probable Cause to Conduct A 
"Search" of the Car to Inspect the Vehicle Identification Number Is Irrelevant Because 
Randall Never Conducted Such a Search. 
This Court need not reach the issue of whether Randall had probable cause to 
conduct a "search" of the car to check its vehicle identification numbers because Randall 
never conducted such a search. Although Randall intended to examine the VIN number, 
the record establishes and the trial court found, that Randall never initiated a search of the 
car until after he observed a marijuana pipe in the pocket of the passenger side door and 
after defendant admitted there were illegal drugs in the car (R. 98). Accordingly, 
defendant's argument in Point II of her brief notwithstanding, the State need not establish 
that Randall had probable cause to conduct a "search" of the vehicle based on his stated 
intent to examine the vehicle identification number. 
POINT II 
RANDALL'S SEIZURE OF THE CORNCOB PIPE WAS 
CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE HE HAD PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE PIPE WAS ILLEGAL DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA 
Considering the totality of the circumstances known to Randall at the time he 
seized defendant's pipe, the trial court's determination that Randall was justified in 
seizing the pipe was correct and should be affirmed. 
Determinations of whether probable cause exists require a common sense 
assessment of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time the 
14 
search is made. State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986). Probable cause is 
more than suspicion but less than certainty: 
In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical 
considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], 
not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative 
to what must be proved. 
Id. (quoting Brinegar v. Untied States, 338 U.S. 160,175,69 S. Ct. 1302,1310 (1949)). 
Accordingly, probable cause is "onlv the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of 
criminal activity." State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284,285 (Utah App. 1990) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Against the backdrop of investigating the possibility that the vehicle was stolen, 
Randall saw the corncob pipe in the passenger door pocket and recognized it as a 
"marijuana pipe" (R. 34,68). Randall then asked defendant and the driver "if they had 
any tobacco. They said they didn't. [Randall retrieved the pipe and smelled it[. He] 
could [sm]ell the odor of burnt marijuana coming from it" (R. 34). In the course of 
upholding Randall's decision to sniff the pipe to confirm or dispel his suspicion that it 
had been used to smoke marijuana, the trial court recognized that "the com cob pipe 
[was] not an unusual item to use in the ingestion of drugs, particularly marijuana" (R. 98). 
The trial court's determination that corncob pipes are known to be used to smoke 
marijuana is amply supported by Randall's testimony that he recognized the pipe as a 
"marijuana pipe" as well as cases from other jurisdictions noting the use of corncob pipes 
15 
to ingest illegal drugs. See, e.g.. Commonwealth v. Waters, 20 Va. App. 285,456 S.E.2d 
257 (1995) (corncob pipe used to smoke marijuana and cocaine); Korby v. State. 567 
P.2d 961 (Nevada 1977) (appellant "produced some marijuana and a corncob pipe and 
passed them to the others"); State v. Gannawav, 291 Minn. 391,191 N.W.2d 255 (1971) 
(affirming suppression of corncob pipe with marijuana residue and baggy of marijuana 
that were seized during otherwise lawful frisk search because officer lacked probable 
cause to make "nonprotective" search for contraband that resulted in discovery of pipe 
and marijuana). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances known to Randall when he seized the 
corncob pipe, and affording the trial judge an appropriate measure of deference to apply 
the probable cause legal standard to the particular facts of this case, the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress the corncob pipe and the remaining evidence seized 
during the subsequent search of the car should be upheld and defendant's convictions 
affirmed. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress and affirm defendant's convictions. 
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but without more, I don't think it lises'to the level of reasonable 
suspicion that it's paraphernalia, let alone probable cause to seize it 
and to smell it. For that reason, I thirik that the Motion to Suppress 
should succeed. 
THE COURT: The court, before considering any of 
these cases, we're always talking about reasonable, reasonable. Of 
course, the whole thing is based upon the fact that that wonderful 
document, the Constitution, leaves those things up to varying times, 
because all it says is we will be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure, PERIOD. And then, that leaves the courts in the position 
where they've got to interpret what is and is not reasonable. 
But, the, of course, there's no question, as you indicate, there 
isn't any question about the legality of the stop. Once the stop is 
made then, of course, anything that precedes that and follows must 
be based upon reasonable suspicion, based upon articulative facts. In 
other words, did the officer have reason then, to stop and ask them to 
get out of the car, and everything, after they had taken care of the 
speeding situation, or was in the process of doing that? And, of 
course, the articular facts, we have to go to what the officer saw and 
perceived from his standpoint, and, uh, when the license check came 
back that there was no record, or they couldn't find it, that was an 
articulative fact which would lead to some suspicion. Then, when 
there is no registration, but all—he hands him some kind of receipt for| 
work, as he says, and then this thing here, which is a hand prepared, 
and is obviously not printed by some state agen—well, of course, it 
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could be prepared, but it's not printed' out by some state agency, and 
it doesn't have any name on it. It just, has a VIN number. Again, 
there's an particular suspicion, Justifiable in his mind, at that time, I 
think, and would be reasonable. I need to check that VIN number to 
see. Even if he saw it didn't correspond, then, I'm sure they'd be on 
their way. So, the point comes up, and the court feels, that he had 
articulated facts enough to want to check the VIN number to make 
sure this car wasn't stolen, or illegally'possessed. 
So, at that point, then, the court concludes two of—because of 
security reasons, and so on, and the fact that the court's—the officer's 
attention has to be directed elsewhere besides the people in the car, 
that he had a reasonable grounds to ask them to leave the vehicle, 
while he made that check. But, of course, he didn't get to that point 
because he saw the corn cob pipe, which is not an unusual item to 
use in the ingestion of drugs, particularly, marijuana, and that he was 
reasonable in smelling it, just to eliminate the possibility that it might 
be being used for tobacco, or something else. But, marijuana does 
have a peculiar smell. In fact, I've had it here in the courtroom. I 
ordered them to take it out because it stinks so bad. But, he saw that] 
and, then, of course, then the picture completely changes because, at 
that point, the defendant admitted that there were drugs in the 
vehicle. • 
Once that admission is made, then there is certainly reasonable 
cause to check the vehicle to see the quantity, what's there, and so 
on. Then we don't have to worry about anything else once the 
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admission is made that there are drugs present in the vehicle. 
So, The court finds that he had tjie reasonable suspicion to do 
what he did in asking the people to leave the vehicle and what he 
perceived after that where the pipe wafs in his plain view, and he 
didn't have to tear open a glove compartment, or anything, to get to 
it. It was there in plain sight. 
So, the court will deny the Motion to Suppress. 
MS. REILLY: For clarification, Your Honor, for our 
purposes, is the court holding that all the officer needed was 
reasonable suspicion to search that pipe? 
THE COURT: Based upon articulable facts, yes, 
that's true. So, do you need anything else in this case? 
MS. REILLY: Yes, Your Honor. May I have a 
moment. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. REILLY: Your Honor, I've asked Mr. Halls earlier, 
he's indicated his willingness to allow her to enter a conditional plea 
to all three counts of the Information. We would ask that we be able 
to do that and have immediate sentencing. 
THE COURT: Of course, the condition would be that 
you would have a right of appeal? 
MS REILLY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sure, okay. Is that correct Mr. Halls? 
MR. HALLS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, then, conditioned on, of 
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